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Abstract 
In keeping with the tradition of the Hypervelocity Impact Society, this paper is a written version of the keynote address I presented 
at the start of 2015 Hypervelocity Impact Symposium as the recipient of the Society’s Distinguished Scientist Award. It covers the 
highlights of my nearly 30 year career working in the area of hypervelocity impact phenomenology, mainly as it is applied to the 
protection of humans and spacecraft that work an operate in the micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) environment. 
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1. Introduction 
I am deeply grateful to the Hypervelocity Impact Society, its Awards Committee, and the Board of Directors for 
selecting to receive the Society’s Distinguished Scientist Award at the 2015 Hypervelocity Impact Symposium 
(HVIS2015). I am humbled when I read the list of the names of previous award recipients, and honored to be included 
in this distinguished group.  
This paper is a written version of the keynote address I presented at the start of HVIS2015. In keeping with 
tradition, it covers the highlights of my nearly 30 year career working in the area of hypervelocity impact 
phenomenology, mainly as it is applied to the protection of humans and spacecraft that work an operate in the 
micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) environment. Over these past 30 or so years I have been fortunate enough 
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to work with many talented and gifted graduate students, scientists, engineers, analysts, and modelers, and it is only 
thanks to their keen insights and assistance that I have been able to accomplish what I have. Special acknowledgements 
are due, however, to the following individuals:  
 Roy Taylor and Miria Finckenor (formerly and currently at the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center, 
respectively), who gave my career the jump-start it needed when I was a new Assistant Professor at the University 
of Alabama in Huntsville; 
 Joel Williamsen (formerly at the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center and currently with the Institute for Defense 
Analyses), who has had the burden of working with me for many of these past 30 years on a variety of topics 
related to space debris;  
 Dave Jerome (formerly at Eglin Air Force Base), who introduced me to DoD aspects of hypervelocity impact 
phenomenologies and studies;  
 Klaus Thoma, Frank Schafer, and Robin Putzar (currently at the Ernst Mach Institute), who were kind enough to 
welcome me to the Fraunhofer Ernst Mach Institute for 7 months as a Humboldt Research Awardee and to give 
me a much-needed break from my academic administration duties;  
 Steve Scott and Mike Squire (currently at the NASA Engineering Safety Center), who have asked me to serve on 
several NESC Technical Committees, thereby broadening my appreciation of the needs of NASA and its 
contractors when dealing with the problem of space debris;  
 Martin Ratliff (currently at the NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory), who introduced me to the world of robotic 
spacecraft and who keeps reminding me that robotic spacecraft have different needs and requirements that human 
rated spacecraft; and, 
 Charlie Anderson, Lalit Chhabildas, and everyone else with whom I have had the pleasure of working as a member 
of the Hypervelocity Impact Society and who also served as my mentors over the span of my career. 
 
In looking back, it is apparent that the work that I have done has always been about increasing the safety of human 
space operations. Specifically, whether through data analysis and empirical model development or through modelling 
efforts that led to suggested possible modifications to ‘standard’ ballistic limit equations for thin multi-wall systems, 
the primary focus of the work has always been to gain a deeper understanding of the phenomenology involved in high 
speed impacts so that we can better protect our astronauts and our spacecraft against the hazards and risks posed by 
MMOD impacts. My career thus far can be thought of as having three phases:  
 The early years, as a newly minted Assistant Professor at the UAH, when I spent a lot of time analyzing and 
making sense of the reams of data that were generated at NASA/MSFC under the Phase B and C/D test programs 
that supported the development the international space station, 
 The middle years, when I ventured to develop analytical models of the various phenomena that occur during a 
hypervelocity impact, and 
 Recent years, when I have be lucky enough to a work on a much wider variety of problems, as well as serving on 
several NRC/NAE and NESC technical committees. 
 
These phases overlap, of course, and the activities and knowledge gained in one supported the activities and 
exercises in the other. However, another common thread throughout my work is that I have tended to work in areas 
or on topics were just outside the more mainstream activities related to high speed impact testing and spacecraft 
protection. For example, while the majority of the analysis was being performed on normal impact test data obtained 
using spherical aluminum projectiles, I was intrigued by and directed my energies towards the study of oblique 
impacts, non-spherical, and non-aluminum projectiles. These activities naturally gave rise to studies on the kind of 
hole (not simply whether or not there was a hole) in a pressure wall, what happens within a module following a 
penetrating impact, and characterizing ricochet debris, among others. 
In the next few sections I will attempt to summarize the more salient points that have come out of these various 
studies. In order to understand the context of my work, it is important to first lay out just what exactly constituted the 
mainstream of testing and analysis work in the area of hypervelocity impact and spacecraft protection in the time 
period beginning with the late 1980s. It is my hope that future generations of rocket scientists will be able to continue 
and expand upon these studies as we continue to unravel all the wonder and mysteries associated with these highly 
energetic phenomena. 
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2. Setting the stage 
The near-earth space environment, where most satellites, the Shuttle, and the International Space Station orbit the 
earth, is cluttered with naturally occurring micrometeoroids and pieces of man-made orbital debris. This orbital debris 
ranges in size from microscopic solid propellant particles to spent rocket boosters still in earth orbit. All earth-orbiting 
spacecraft are therefore susceptible to impacts by these pieces of orbital debris. Although orbital debris ceases to 
become a threat for interplanetary spacecraft once they leave the confines of earth orbit, they remain susceptible to 
impacts by meteoroids and other “natural debris.”  
Orbital debris and meteoroid impacts can occur at extremely high speeds and can damage flight- and mission-
critical systems. This can, in turn, lead to spacecraft failure and possibly loss of life. As mission time increases, the 
probability that such an impact can occur also increases. Therefore, the design of all spacecraft must take into account 
the possibility of such impacts and their effects on the spacecraft and on all of its exposed system components. For 
this reason, extensive studies have been performed that are devoted to investigating and assessing these threats, as 
well as protecting spacecraft through a variety of shielding techniques. To prevent mission failure and/or loss of life, 
protection against damage by micro-meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particles is typically included in the design 
of a spacecraft in the form of a hypervelocity impact shield. 
Traditional damage-resistant wall design for spacecraft operating in the MMOD environment consists of a 
'bumper' wall that is placed at a small distance away from the main or inner wall of the spacecraft component. This 
concept was first proposed in the 1940s and is referred to as the “Whipple Shield” [1]. It has been studied extensively 
in the last four decades as a means of reducing the perforation threat of hypervelocity projectiles. A sketch of a typical 
dual-wall Whipple Shield is shown in Figure 1 (where a multi-layer thermal insulation blanket is shown to occupy a 
position between the protective bumper and the main inner wall of the spacecraft). Such a dual-wall configuration had 
been repeatedly shown to provide significant increases in protection against perforation by relatively small high-speed 
projectiles over an equivalent single-wall structure. 
 
 
Figure 1. Illustration of a typical dual-wall Whipple Shield 
 
The bumper protects the spacecraft component by disintegrating the impacting particle to create one or more 
diffuse debris clouds that travel towards and eventually impact the spacecraft element. However, the impacts of these 
debris clouds impart a significantly lower impulsive loading to the inner wall than would an intact projectile. The area 
over which this impulsive loading is distributed is governed by the manner in which the projectile and bumper 
fragment, melt, or vaporize, and by the spacing between the bumper and the inner wall. 
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Occasionally, the impact of the debris clouds could result in rarefaction stresses near the rear surface of the inner 
wall that exceed the dynamic tensile fracture strength of the inner wall material. In these cases, spall fragments are 
ejected further ‘inward’ at high velocities from the rear side of the inner wall. These high speed particles could 
themselves inflict damage in internal spacecraft components, such as e-boxes, radiator lines, and cables.  
The performance of a hypervelocity impact shield is typically characterized by its ballistic limit equation (BLE), 
which defines the threshold particle size that causes perforation of, or detached spall from, the inner wall of the multi-
wall system as a function of velocity, impact angle, particle density, shield and inner wall thicknesses and particle 
shape. These BLEs are typically drawn as lines of demarcation between regions of inner-wall perforation and no 
perforation (P/NP) in two-dimensional projectile diameter-impact velocity space and when graphically represented, 
are often referred to, in this form, as ballistic limit curves (BLCs).   
The high-speed impact testing that provides data for the development of these BLEs and their BLCs typically use 
spherical projectiles fired in light gas guns at impact velocities between 3 and 7 km/s. These data are then fitted with 
scaled single-wall equations below approx. 3 km/s, and with theoretical momentum and/or energy based penetration 
relationships above approx. 7 km/s to obtain three-part BLCs that cover the full range of impact velocity, that is, from 
approx. 0.5 to 16 km/s for debris, and up to several tens of km/s for meteoroids. The transitional velocity region (from 
approx. 3 to approx. 7 km/s for normal impacts) takes the form of a linear interpolation between the low and high 
velocity regions.  





Figure 2. Generic dual-wall and single-wall ballistic limit curves for aluminum-on-aluminum impacts 
 
In Figure 2, the single-wall BLE is seen to be a monotonically decreasing function as impact velocity is increased, 
while the dual-wall BLE displays the traditional, well-known “bucket” shape of the three-part BLEs that have been 
developed for such configurations. This shape of the dual-wall BLE is a direct result of the phenomenological changes 
in response that occur at impact velocities that result in (nearly) complete projectile fragmentation (near 3 km/s for 
aluminum-on-aluminum impacts) and complete projectile melt (near 7 km/s for aluminum-on-aluminum impacts). 
The space between the single- and dual-wall equations is a measure of the increase in protection provided by dual-
wall systems over that provided by equal-weight single-wall configurations. 
Reference [2] presents a history of the development of these types of BLEs. Up through the late 1980s, BLEs 
such as those shown in Figure 2 were typically derived from tests under the following conditions: 
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1. normal impact; 
2. spherical aluminum projectiles; 
3. flat unstressed aluminum plates; and, 
4. light-weight thermal insulation blankets (if included at all). 
 
In the early 1990s, as the international space station became a reality, the sophistication of testing programs and 
analysis capabilities improved greatly. As a result, these limited test parameters and configurations evolved to include 
non-normal (or oblique) impacts of non-spherical, non-aluminum projectiles impacting targets more representative of 
spacecraft components (e.g. tiles, e-boxes, wire harnesses, or dual-wall systems with more complex intermediate 
blankets, etc). It was at this exciting time that I entered the arena of space debris protection system analysis and design, 
and was confronted with a wealth of new information that needed to be studied and analyzed. 
3. Oblique impacts 
In the majority of early investigations of hypervelocity impact, the trajectories of the projectiles were normal to 
the surfaces of the impacted test specimens. However, it is evident that most meteoroid or space debris impacts will 
not occur normal to the surfaces of a spacecraft. Unfortunately, information on oblique hypervelocity impact was 
relatively scarce in the 1980s, so was difficult to assess the severity of such impacts on a candidate spacecraft wall 
structural system. Furthermore, studies of oblique impact that had been performed previously typically did not discuss 
the possibility of damage to external systems due to ricochet debris particles. To increase the understanding of 
phenomena associated with oblique hypervelocity impact, light gas gun tests conducted at NASA in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s began to include more non-normal impact firings to generate (and to subsequently analyze) oblique 
hypervelocity impact test data.  
Figure 3 shows a sketch of the dual-wall test configuration (without any intervening MLI), while Figure 4 shows 
the formation of penetration and ricochet debris clouds in a 45-deg impact [3]. 
 
 










Figure 4. Formation of ricochet and penetration debris clouds, v~6 km/s, θ=45-deg, ts/dp~3 (from [3]) 
Figures 5-8 show typical changes in the damage morphology that is sustained by pressure walls as the impact 
obliquity is increased [4]. The specific tests shown in Figure 5-8 were performed at impact velocities of ~7 km/s using 
7.95 mm diameter aluminum projectiles. The bumper, pressure wall, and ricochet witness plates were made of 6061-
T6, 2219-T87, and 2219-T6 aluminum, respectively. Their thicknesses were held constant at 1.6, 3.175, and 2.54 mm, 
respectively. These figures also show the damage sustained by the ricochet witness plates in each of those tests. 
 
 
Figure 5. Damaged pressure wall and ricochet witness plate, 30-deg impact (from [4]) 
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Figure 6. Damaged pressure wall and ricochet witness plate, 45-deg impact (from [4]) 
 
 





Figure 8. Damaged pressure wall and ricochet witness plate, 75-deg impact (from [4]) 
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It quickly became evident from these and other follow-on tests that the damage potential of ricochet debris could 
be quite high, especially for very high obliquity impacts. It was also found in these studies that beyond a certain critical 
impact angle, the in-line penetrating debris cloud no longer followed close to the original impact trajectory, but rather 
began to bend back towards the normal between the bumper and the pressure wall. It was also beyond this critical 
angle that particle damage to the ricochet witness plate became quite substantial. This critical angle was estimated to 
have a value of 60-deg to 65-deg. 
All ricochet debris poses a threat to external spacecraft components that lie in its path. However, the threat could 
be very significant in the case of highly oblique impacts, which, from Figures 7 and 8, can be surmised to produce 
debris clouds with relatively large ricocheting particles. An empirical model was developed to characterize the ricochet 
ejecta particles that would be created by a high speed impact on a typical bumper plate [5]. Specifically, the model 
developed predicts the spread and trajectory of ricochet debris particles created in a hypervelocity impact as well as 
the size and velocity of the most damage particle in the ricochet debris cloud.  
The table in Figure 9 presents a comparison between the average ricochet debris particle diameters and velocities 
calculated in a previous experimental study and the average particle velocities and diameters calculated using the 
empirical model. As can be seen from this figure, the average diameter values predicted by the equations developed 
in this study compare favorably with those calculated previously. However, the average velocity values predicted by 














Figure 9. Comparison of average empirical and predicted ricochet particle diameters and velocities  
(Reference [6] in [5] same as [6] in this paper). 
4. Use of composite materials 
As mentioned previously, the traditional approach to mitigating the damage that would be caused by high-speed 
on-orbit MMOD impacts consists of placing one or more “bumper” shields small distances away from the primary 
load-bearing “inner wall” of the spacecraft. Behind the inner wall of such a multi-wall system, as in the case of the 
International Space Station, for example, are located the equipment racks, crew quarters, science experiment hardware, 
etc. With the advent of many new high-strength composite materials and their proliferation in aerospace applications, 
it quickly became evident that it was necessary to evaluate their potential for use as part of a multi-wall configuration 
in long-duration space and aerospace structural systems such as the international space station. 
Furthermore, most satellites launched into Earth orbit are constructed with honeycomb sandwich panels as their 
primary structural load bearing elements without a bumper shield because design, cost, and / or mission constraints 
prevent the inclusion of a protective shield. In these cases, the load-bearing honeycomb sandwich panels (HC/SPs) 
also serve as the protection systems for the spacecraft components that are located behind them, such as electronics, 
avionics, fuel cells, pressure vessels, etc. In both cases it is important to know whether or not the impacting particle 
(or its remnants) will exit the rear of a spacecraft wall system, whether it is a “Whipple-type” multi-wall system or a 
“single” HC/SP wall. 
References [7,8] contain a historical overview of the high-speed impact testing of composite material panels and 
HC/SPs. Not surprisingly, the extent of the effort to study composite material and composite structural systems such 
as HC/SP panels has been much more limited than the effort exerted in the study of metallic (mostly aluminum) multi-
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Figure 6. Damaged pressure wall and ricochet witness plate, 45-deg impact (from [4]) 
 
 





Figure 8. Damaged pressure wall and ricochet witness plate, 75-deg impact (from [4]) 
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wall systems under similar impact conditions. For example, a review of the papers presented at the International 
Ballistics Symposia (published by the host organization) and the Hypervelocity Impact Symposia (published by 
Elsevier) allows us to construct the histogram shown in Figure 10. Also shown in Figure 10 is an accounting of papers 
on this topic appearing in other venues and journals. As can be seen in Figure 10, interest in this area of research is 


























Figure 10. Number of papers on composite and HC/SP HVI 
 
My early work in this area explored changes in the level of protection that would be afforded to a spacecraft if 
composite materials were used either as bumpers, stuffing, or as pressure walls. More recent work focused on 
characterizing impact response of HC/SPs under hypervelocity impacts. The following paragraphs summarize the 
main conclusions reached in these studies. Additional more detailed information on the use of composite materials in 
multi-wall systems or on the response of HC/SPs under high-speed impact can be found in References [9] and [10], 
respectively. 
4.1. Composite outer bumpers 
The response of dual-wall systems with Kevlar and graphite/epoxy (Gr/Ep) outer bumpers was compared against 
that of equal-weight all-aluminum dual-wall systems in the late 1980s by Schonberg [11]. The aluminum bumpers 
were more effective in spreading out the debris created by the initial impact on the bumper than were the Kevlar 
bumpers. Apparently the interaction of the shock waves in the projectile and the Kevlar bumpers prevented complete 
break-up of the projectiles, which decreased the dispersion of debris cloud fragments, thereby increasing the likelihood 
of pressure wall perforation. However, the pressure wall damage areas in dual-wall systems with Gr/Ep bumpers more 
wide-spread than those in equivalent systems with Kevlar bumpers. Pressure wall perforations in Gr/Ep systems 
consisted of several small holes, not one large hole as in the Kevlar systems. From these results, it was concluded that 
using a laminated composite as the outer bumper in a dual-wall system does not offer any protection advantage as 
compared to the protection level provided by an all-aluminum dual-wall system. 
 































Figures 11a,b and 12a,b show the damage sustained by systems with Gr/Ep bumpers and aluminum pressure wall 
plates and that in corresponding systems with aluminum bumpers and aluminum pressure wall plates under very 
similar high speed impact conditions. As expected, there is significant peeling of the outer layers in the Gr/Ep bumper, 
on the front and rear surfaces. The nature of the hole in the pressure wall plate in the test with the Gr/Ep bumper also 
indicates that the projectile passed through the bumper nearly intact. This is in sharp contrast to the evidence of the 
pressure wall plate in the test with the aluminum bumper. In this case the diffuse damage area on the pressure wall 
shows that the projectile was substantially broken up by the aluminum bumper. 
These results were supported by Christiansen [12], who performed an in-depth study in the early 1980s to evaluate 
the effectiveness of metallic, composite, and ceramic materials as MOD shields. Christiansen found that while Gr/Ep 
alone did not shield as well as did aluminum, it had some potential to enhance MOD protection levels when used as 
the second bumper in a double-bumper system with an aluminum outer bumper. The use of composite materials as 
inner bumpers is discussed in the next section. 
4.2. Composite inner bumpers 
The response of triple-wall systems with Kevlar and Spectra inner bumpers was compared against that of all-
metallic triple-wall systems [13]. In nearly all the Kevlar inner bumper tests the Kevlar panels were not perforated, 
whereas their aluminum counterparts sustained large holes. In the Spectra tests, both the Spectra and aluminum inner 
bumpers were perforated. However, the pressure walls in the Spectra systems sustained little or no damage, while 
those in corresponding all-aluminum systems were usually perforated. These results demonstrate that using a 
composite material as the inner bumper does increase the protection afforded to a spacecraft against damage caused 
by MMOD impacts.  
Figure 12a,b. Aluminum bumper and aluminum pressure wall 
plate (from [11]) 
Figure 11a,b. Graphite/epoxy bumper and aluminum pressure 
wall plate (from [11]) 
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Figures 11a,b and 12a,b show the damage sustained by systems with Gr/Ep bumpers and aluminum pressure wall 
plates and that in corresponding systems with aluminum bumpers and aluminum pressure wall plates under very 
similar high speed impact conditions. As expected, there is significant peeling of the outer layers in the Gr/Ep bumper, 
on the front and rear surfaces. The nature of the hole in the pressure wall plate in the test with the Gr/Ep bumper also 
indicates that the projectile passed through the bumper nearly intact. This is in sharp contrast to the evidence of the 
pressure wall plate in the test with the aluminum bumper. In this case the diffuse damage area on the pressure wall 
shows that the projectile was substantially broken up by the aluminum bumper. 
These results were supported by Christiansen [12], who performed an in-depth study in the early 1980s to evaluate 
the effectiveness of metallic, composite, and ceramic materials as MOD shields. Christiansen found that while Gr/Ep 
alone did not shield as well as did aluminum, it had some potential to enhance MOD protection levels when used as 
the second bumper in a double-bumper system with an aluminum outer bumper. The use of composite materials as 
inner bumpers is discussed in the next section. 
4.2. Composite inner bumpers 
The response of triple-wall systems with Kevlar and Spectra inner bumpers was compared against that of all-
metallic triple-wall systems [13]. In nearly all the Kevlar inner bumper tests the Kevlar panels were not perforated, 
whereas their aluminum counterparts sustained large holes. In the Spectra tests, both the Spectra and aluminum inner 
bumpers were perforated. However, the pressure walls in the Spectra systems sustained little or no damage, while 
those in corresponding all-aluminum systems were usually perforated. These results demonstrate that using a 
composite material as the inner bumper does increase the protection afforded to a spacecraft against damage caused 
by MMOD impacts.  
Figure 12a,b. Aluminum bumper and aluminum pressure wall 
plate (from [11]) 
Figure 11a,b. Graphite/epoxy bumper and aluminum pressure 
wall plate (from [11]) 
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Figures 13a,b and 14a,b show the damage sustained by systems with Spectra inner bumpers and aluminum 
pressure wall plates and that in corresponding systems with aluminum inner bumpers and aluminum pressure wall 
plates under nearly identical impact conditions. The pressure wall in the system with the Spectra inner bumper is 
barely damaged while that in the all-aluminum system sustained (as is more typical) a much wider area of damage 




































As summarized in Reference [14], the results of the various test programs performed showed that multi-wall 
systems involving composite material bumpers in combination with aluminum bumpers produced less damaging 
secondary debris or ejecta, and were  
 more efficient in converting the projectile’s kinetic energy into internal thermal energy,  
 less sensitive to projectile shape, and 
 less sensitive to the obliquity of the impacting projectile. 
Furthermore, such hybrid systems resulted in less cumulative damage to the pressure wall of the multi-wall system 
when compared with traditional Whipple-type all-aluminum single-bumper systems [15]. As a result, such systems 
were found to provide better protection against more hazardous non-spherical projectiles when compared to the 
protection level offered by all-aluminum systems [16]. 
 
Figure 14a,b. Aluminum inner bumper and pressure wall 
plate (from [13]) 
Figure 13a,b. Spectra inner bumper and aluminum pressure 
wall plate (from [13]) 
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4.3. Composite pressure walls 
In the mid-1990s, a study was performed to compare the response of dual-wall systems with Graphite/Epoxy 
(Gr/Ep) pressure walls against that of equal-weight all-aluminum dual-wall systems [17]. The results showed there 
are several advantages of using Gr/Ep as a pressure wall material: (1) it eliminates severe cracking and petalling 
sustained by aluminum walls in systems impacted by large projectiles; (2) its ballistic performance is superior to that 
of aluminum for impact velocities above 5.5 km/s; and (3) patching a hole in a perforated Gr/Ep panel, even if it were 
larger than in an aluminum panel, would be relatively easy since the Gr/Ep remains non-deformed and the patch can 
be, e.g., adhesively bonded. Repairing a perforated aluminum wall would be a more difficult procedure since the 
aluminum would likely be cracked and petalled. On-orbit repair of perforated aluminum panels would therefore 


































Figure 15. Comparison of graphite/epoxy and aluminum pressure walls (table and figure from [17]) 
 
Figure 15 shows a summary of the test results for similar systems with Gr/Ep and aluminum pressure wall. As 
can be seen from this figure, the ballistic resistance of these two systems was similar below approx. 5.5 km/s; above 
that velocity, there began to be some differences in response. 
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Figure 15 shows a summary of the test results for similar systems with Gr/Ep and aluminum pressure wall. As 
can be seen from this figure, the ballistic resistance of these two systems was similar below approx. 5.5 km/s; above 
that velocity, there began to be some differences in response. 
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4.4. Response of HC/SPs 
Initial testing of HC/SPs in the 1960s and 1970s produced mixed results and inconsistent predictions regarding 
the ability of such systems to withstand hypervelocity MMOD impacts. High speed impact testing of HC/SPs 
experienced a resurgence in the late 1980s and early 1990s when an increasing number of satellites were being 
designed with HCSPs as the main load-bearing structural elements and subsequently subjected to potential impacts 
by man-made debris in earth orbit. Test programs performed in support of these satellite design and construction 
activities considered not just the impact of the HC/SP, but also what would be the effects of penetrating high speed 
impacts on the satellite systems behind the HC/SP (e.g. fuel pipes, heat pipes, pressure vessels, electronics boxes, 












































Figures 16a,b. Prediction of HC/SP perforations (from [20]) 
14 Author name / Procedia Engineering 00 (2017) 000–000 
 
One outcome of these spacecraft component vulnerability studies was a new BLE that could be applied to various 
structural configurations, including single wall systems, dual-wall systems, multi-wall systems with HC/SPs, batteries, 
e-boxes, harnesses, etc. [18,19]. To assess how well these BLEs performed in terms of predicting perforation (P) or 
non-perforation (NP) of HC/SP systems with aluminum and composite face-sheets, an exercise was undertaken to 
compare the P/NP predictions of the equations in [18] and in [19] against actual P/NP occurrences as found in the data 
from the experimental investigations discussed in this section [20]. It was found that these BLEs are fairly 
conservative: they successfully predicted HC/SP perforation in nearly all of the tests that resulted in perforation, while 
allowing approximately half of the non-perforating tests to be incorrectly labeled as tests with a perforation (see 
Figures 16a,b for perforation prediction of HC/SPs with aluminum and composite face-sheets, respectively). This 
indicates the likelihood that use of these BLEs in design applications could result in overly robust shielding hardware.  
In addition to knowing whether or not the impacting particle (or its remnants) will exit the rear of the HC/SP, it is 
equally important to know, if indeed the ballistic limit of the HC/SP has been exceeded, where the debris created in 
















Figure 17. Debris from a perforating impact striking interior spacecraft components 
 
To help address this issue, a system of empirical equations that can be used to predict the trajectories and spread 
of the debris clouds that exit the rear face-sheet following a high speed perforating impact of a HC/SP was recently 
developed [21]. The equations developed in this study incorporate the following features: 
 presence (or the lack thereof) and composition of a multi-layer thermal insulation (MLI) blanket on the 
exterior of the HC/SP; 
 material composition of the HC/SP face-sheets (either aluminum or a carbon-fiber-reinforced polymer, or 
CFRP); 
 face-sheet thicknesses and overall HC/SP thickness; 
 HC core properties (core size, wall thickness, and material);  
 the ballistic limit of the HC/SP (see Figure 18), and; 
 projectile diameter, material, impact velocity, and trajectory obliquity. 
 
Empirical equations were also developed to predict the dimensions of the holes in the front and rear HC/SP face-
sheets. These hole dimension equations can be used to calculate the amount of mass in a debris cloud if the HC/SP is 
perforated by a high speed impact. The trajectory angles can then be used to determine where this mass will travel and 
what spacecraft components will be impacted, and the spread angles equations will determine the extent of the 
footprint made by this mass on any encountered surface. All of this information can then be fed into a risk assessment 
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Figure 18. Difference between “simple” and “BL-based” empirical equations 
5. Non-spherical projectiles 
As a practical matter, most of the BLEs in use have been constructed from impact test databases involving only 
spherical projectiles. When using spherical projectile, impact orientation is a non-issue. When using cylindrical, 
chunky, or disk projectile, the orientation of the projectile upon impact on the bumper plays a crucial role in 
determining the subsequent response of the pressure wall. Figure 19 shows a rather unusual perforation morphology 























Figure 19. Hole in Pressure Wall Plate of a Dual-Wall System following the Normal Impact of a Cylindrical Projectile. 
 
Morrison [23], Piekutowski [24], and others have shown that non-spherical projectiles can be more damaging than 
equal mass spherical projectiles under the same impact conditions. In the case of rod-like projectiles, this is mostly 
due to the incomplete fragmentation of the incoming projectile by the bumper. The intact portion of the projectile is 
clearly evident in Figure 20, which shows a frame from the numerical simulation of an L/D=2 projectile on a dual-
wall system [25].  





















Figure 20a,b. Numerical Simulation of an L/D=2 Cylinder Impacting a Dual-Wall System 
 
Of course, spheres are not expected to be a common shape for orbital debris; rather, orbital debris fragments might 
be better represented by other regular or irregular solids. A study was performed to develop BLEs and their 
corresponding curves (BLCs) for a typical dual-wall configuration impacted by a variety of non-spherical projectiles 
[26]. Figure 21 shows the projectile shapes that were considered in that study. The responses of the dual-wall system 
to impacts by the projectiles shown in Figure 17 were obtained using the AUTODYN software package.  
 
Figure 21. Projectile Shapes Used in BLE Development Study 
 
For each shape, impact simulations were conducted at velocities ranging from 1 to 15 km/s. Projectile mass was 
increased to a point where the projectile (or ensuing debris cloud) was able to perforate the rear wall. BLCs were then 
drawn between regions of rear-wall perforation and no-perforation in 2-D projectile mass-impact velocity space. In 
order to make the various non-spherical projectile BLCs comparable to the spherical projectile-based curves, the non-
spherical projectiles mass–impact velocity curves were converted into equivalent spherical diameter–impact velocity 
curves using an equal mass consideration. Equivalent spherical projectile diameters were calculated by equating the 
volume of a sphere to the volume of the projectile being considered and then by solving the sphere’s diameter. Figure 
22 shows the resulting family of BLCs for the non-spherical projectiles considered, as well as for a sphere. 
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due to the incomplete fragmentation of the incoming projectile by the bumper. The intact portion of the projectile is 
clearly evident in Figure 20, which shows a frame from the numerical simulation of an L/D=2 projectile on a dual-
wall system [25].  





















Figure 20a,b. Numerical Simulation of an L/D=2 Cylinder Impacting a Dual-Wall System 
 
Of course, spheres are not expected to be a common shape for orbital debris; rather, orbital debris fragments might 
be better represented by other regular or irregular solids. A study was performed to develop BLEs and their 
corresponding curves (BLCs) for a typical dual-wall configuration impacted by a variety of non-spherical projectiles 
[26]. Figure 21 shows the projectile shapes that were considered in that study. The responses of the dual-wall system 
to impacts by the projectiles shown in Figure 17 were obtained using the AUTODYN software package.  
 
Figure 21. Projectile Shapes Used in BLE Development Study 
 
For each shape, impact simulations were conducted at velocities ranging from 1 to 15 km/s. Projectile mass was 
increased to a point where the projectile (or ensuing debris cloud) was able to perforate the rear wall. BLCs were then 
drawn between regions of rear-wall perforation and no-perforation in 2-D projectile mass-impact velocity space. In 
order to make the various non-spherical projectile BLCs comparable to the spherical projectile-based curves, the non-
spherical projectiles mass–impact velocity curves were converted into equivalent spherical diameter–impact velocity 
curves using an equal mass consideration. Equivalent spherical projectile diameters were calculated by equating the 
volume of a sphere to the volume of the projectile being considered and then by solving the sphere’s diameter. Figure 
22 shows the resulting family of BLCs for the non-spherical projectiles considered, as well as for a sphere. 
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Figure 22. Numerically-based Ballistic Limit Curves for Non-Spherical Projectiles 
 
As expected, the short or chunky projectiles (sphere and face-on cube impact) had the least perforating ability, 
while those of the longest solid projectiles (cylinder and cone) were the highest. The implication of these results is 
that if a spacecraft wall system were designed using spherical projectile-based BLCs, the design could be highly non-
conservative and possibly unsafe. 
It is also important to note that that the BLCs in Figure 22 were drawn in terms of equivalent spherical projectile 
diameter as a function of impact velocity. However, in order to be useful for spacecraft design, BLCs need to be 
presented in units that are consistent with environment flux models used in that design process. Current orbital debris 
re-entry models use a single one-dimensional characteristic length that is effectively a radar cross-section (RCS) 
diameter. BLCs that are presented in a format that employs a characteristic length instead of an equivalent spherical 
diameter are likely to be more consistent with orbital debris environment predictions, and should find greater utility 
in spacecraft risk assessment and design. 
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In a follow-on study [27], the BLCs in Figure 22 were re-cast using an RCS diameter as the characteristic length. 
The recast BLCs were found to be more tightly grouped, and were not as spread out as they were when simply plotted 
using equivalent spherical projectile diameter (see Figure 23). As a result, the effect of projectile shape on penetrating 
ability was shown to be somewhat reduced when using characteristic length as opposed to equivalent mass for 
comparison purposes. 
One of the major conclusions of this study was that, at least from an RCS characteristic length perspective, the 
spherical projectile is not necessarily the least conservative projectile shape on which to base or develop a BLC for a 
multi-wall system. This was in stark contrast with the then-prevailing wisdom which presumed that spherical 
projectiles are the least damaging of all shapes. 
The need for a more realistic projectile size and shape in risk assessments was revisited in two recent studies on 
the susceptibility of dual-wall structures [28] and the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) to MMOD impacts [29]. 
For the purposes of performing penetration risk analyses, NASA currently assumes that the shape of the impacting 
orbital debris particle is a sphere, with a diameter equal to the particle characteristic length. A number of different 
ground-based experiments have generated mass distributions for typical orbital debris fragments that could be 
expected to impact spacecraft. These tests have also shown that the much smaller fragments tend to be chunkier or 
more ‘cube-like’, while the larger fragments are more flake-like, and being to resemble potato-chips in shape.  
The mass distribution from such tests are plotted versus their measured characteristic length (LC) in Figures 24a-
d. Also plotted in each figure are the mass values for spheres having the characteristics lengths as diameters (the red 
lines). It is apparent in these figures that the masses of spheres with diameters equal to LC values above the “crossing 




























Figure 24a-d. Comparison of Satellite Fragment Masses to Aluminum Sphere Equivalents (from [29]) 
 
As such, when LC exceeds the “crossing point” value, the realistic (i.e. non-spherical) debris fragments are less 
penetrating than currently assumed, an assumption which in turn currently leads to an over-prediction of risk. 
Offsetting this to some degree, however, is the simplifying presumption of shape – as seen before, for a given mass, 
Fig. 5. Comparing mass of satellite fragments to aluminum spheres, 
Original SOCIT data (Reynolds et al., 1998). 
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Figure 24a-d. Comparison of Satellite Fragment Masses to Aluminum Sphere Equivalents (from [29]) 
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non-spherical particle shapes can be more penetrating than a sphere. An actual orbital debris fragment, therefore, can 
be either more or less penetrating than that being estimated by the solid sphere of the same ‘size’ (i.e., by taking 
characteristic length equal to spherical diameter), depending on which of these two effects dominates. The fragment 
will be less penetrating because of the smaller mass, but may be more penetrating because of the irregular shape. 
This study also showed that, after taking all these competing issues into considerations, continuing to use 
aluminum spheres in spacecraft risk assessments could result in assessed risk values that might be higher by a factor 
of 2 than those obtained if more realistic projectile shapes were used. In such a case, there could be an over-design of 
a spacecraft’s MMOD protection systems, and the spacecraft would be heavier than needed, cost more to construct 
than needed, and cost more to put into orbit than needed. This study demonstrated the need to incorporate effects of 
mass and shape in mission risk assessment prior to first flight of any spacecraft as well as the need to continue to 
develop/refine BLEs so that they more accurately reflect the shape and material density variations inherent to the 
actual debris environment. The result of such activities would be spacecraft design and risk assessment processes that 
include more appropriate models of spacecraft response when threatened by the orbital debris environment. 
Of course, the question naturally arises regarding just which BLE to use to assess the effect of an impact of a non-
spherical projectile on a target structure. After all, a flake-like debris particle or a cube-like particle can impact a target 
at any number of different orientations, and each orientation has its own BLE. Therefore, in addition to the shape of 
the impacting particle, the orientation of the particle at the time of impact is of great importance to its penetrating 
ability. Note from Figures 22 and 23 that the impact of the cube at different orientations produces a wide variation in 
ballistic limit. As a result, it is important to consider the likelihood of each type of particle shape and impact orientation 
when performing an overall risk assessment of a spacecraft. 
The likelihood of different shapes could be determined from a variety of sources, including ground-based tests, 
radar cross section measurements of satellite debris, and ground-based modeling of breakup events using hydrocodes 
or other means. The likelihood of different orientations and the effect on overall ballistic limit can be calculated using 
a method similar to that used in aircraft survivability analyses.  In this approach, a regular solid (like a cube), can be 
broken into 26 views spaced at 45 degrees from one another (see Figure 25).  In the case of a cube, six of the views 
(23%) result in a view of the cube face, 12 of the views (46%) result in a view of the cube edge, and 8 of the views 



















Figure 25. Impact Trajectory “Views” for a Cube 
By treating these views as particle orientations coincident with the velocity vector, a weighted ballistic limit curve 
can be derived from individual hydrocode ballistic limit predictions for each view (or orientation). Figure 26 shows 
such an orientation-weighted ballistic limit curve for the cube shape 
 
 
























Figure 26. Original and Orientation-Weighted Ballistic Limit Curves for a Cube 
6. Post-impact response characteristics 
In some cases, it is equally important to know, not only whether or not a module or wall perforation will occur, but 
also what might be the effects of such a perforation after some time has elapsed. Of particular interest in the 
development of habitable spacecraft such as the international space station are the issues of late-stage structural 
vibrations that might result from air rushing out of a perforated module and the effects of a module perforation on its 
inhabitants (e.g. pressure loss, etc). 
6.1 Late-stage Structural Vibrations 
The perforation of a habitable module that is part of a habitable space structure in earth orbit by an orbital debris 
particle will result in a thrust normal to the module surface. The  thrust  is caused  by air  exhausting  through  the  
hole  in  the  module  wall created  by  the impact. A study was performed to examine the ensuing global dynamic 
response of the Space Station Freedom following such a module rupture, assuming that structural integrity would be 
maintained [30]. Several impact situations were considered. In each situation, the objective was to predict a worst-










Figure 27a-c Impact Scenarios Considered in Vibration Study (from [30]) 
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6. Post-impact response characteristics 
In some cases, it is equally important to know, not only whether or not a module or wall perforation will occur, but 
also what might be the effects of such a perforation after some time has elapsed. Of particular interest in the 
development of habitable spacecraft such as the international space station are the issues of late-stage structural 
vibrations that might result from air rushing out of a perforated module and the effects of a module perforation on its 
inhabitants (e.g. pressure loss, etc). 
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particle will result in a thrust normal to the module surface. The  thrust  is caused  by air  exhausting  through  the  
hole  in  the  module  wall created  by  the impact. A study was performed to examine the ensuing global dynamic 
response of the Space Station Freedom following such a module rupture, assuming that structural integrity would be 
maintained [30]. Several impact situations were considered. In each situation, the objective was to predict a worst-










Figure 27a-c Impact Scenarios Considered in Vibration Study (from [30]) 
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After a module wall is perforated, a thrust is generated as the pressurized air in the modules discharges into the 
near-zero ambient pressure space environment. This thrust is the forcing function used in the solutions of the equations 

















Figure 28a,b. Thrust Histories for Four Hole Diameters 
 
The maximum vibration displacements we calculated were, admittedly, a bit smaller than we had thought would 
occur. However, the mass of the modules, approx. 148,860 kg, is considerable; their weight on earth is approx. 1.46 
MN. The maximum calculated force value of 1472 N was quite small when compared with the weight of the clusters. 
Based on the results   obtained, it appears that the vibration amplitudes will not compromise the structural integrity of 
the space station. The maximum calculated deflections following a perforating orbital debris  particle  impact  are 
small (less than  approx. 1.7 m)  when  compared  to  the  length of the SSF  from the modules to solar arrays (approx. 
60 m). These findings indicate that, in the event of a module wall rupture, the survivability limitation may be a human-
related factor rather than a space-station-related factor. For example, the rapid rate of de-pressurization would be 
serious issue, and the ability of the crew to isolate the damaged module would be critical.   
6.2 Internal effects 
The issue of what happens ‘inside’ a pressurized module following an orbital debris impact was initial considered 
during the Apollo program [31,32]. The issue naturally arose again during the design of the space station, only this 
time the habitable, pressurized volume of the station module cluster was significantly larger than that of the command 
module.  
In an attempt to address this issue, a first-principles-based model was developed to predict the effect of a 
perforating orbital debris particle impact on the pressure and temperature within a pressurized habitable spacecraft 
module [33]. The model was developed such that it sequentially characterized the phenomena comprising the impact 
event, beginning with the initial impact on the outer module wall, the creation and motion of a debris cloud within the 
module wall system, and the impact of the debris cloud on the inner module wall. The final phase of the model was 
concerned with the creation and motion of the debris cloud that enters the module interior and its effect within the 
module on module pressure and temperature levels. This characterization is accomplished through the application of 
elementary shock physics theory and fundamental thermodynamic principles. Figure 29 shows a sketch of the pressure 
attenuation for the internal debris cloud.  
The predictions of the analytical model are compared with experimental pressure and temperature data from a 
series of instrumented high-speed impact tests. Figure 30 shows the experimental set-up and the locations of the 

























Figure 29. Internal Debris Cloud Parameters and Pressure Attenuation Model 
 





















Figure 30. Pressure and Temperature Sensor Locations 
 
Several modifications are made to the basic model to bring its predictions closer in line with the experimental 
results. For example, it appeared that the pressure was attenuated too rapidly by the original model, so a semi-empirical 
function was introduced that would ‘stretch out’ the attenuation of the pressure behind the penetrated pressure wall 
plate. Following the introduction of this function and the adjustment of several empirical constants, the predictions of 
the modified internal effects model are shown to be in close agreement with the experimental results. Table 1 shows 
a comparison of experimentally obtained pressure and temperature values at the locations indicated in Figure 30 and 
the predictions of the model developed in this study. 
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Figure 30. Pressure and Temperature Sensor Locations 
 
Several modifications are made to the basic model to bring its predictions closer in line with the experimental 
results. For example, it appeared that the pressure was attenuated too rapidly by the original model, so a semi-empirical 
function was introduced that would ‘stretch out’ the attenuation of the pressure behind the penetrated pressure wall 
plate. Following the introduction of this function and the adjustment of several empirical constants, the predictions of 
the modified internal effects model are shown to be in close agreement with the experimental results. Table 1 shows 
a comparison of experimentally obtained pressure and temperature values at the locations indicated in Figure 30 and 
the predictions of the model developed in this study. 
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Table 1 Pressure and temperature prediction comparisons 
 
Sensor 










1E 17 15.2 18 43.2 
1W 18 15.2 27 43.2 
2E 4 7.2 23 23.0 
2W 6 7.2 20 23.0 
3E 3 3.2 25 11.6 
3W 2 3.2 n/a 11.6 
Test 3 
1E 21 24.3 104 63.9 
1W 21 24.3 118 63.9 
2E 17 17.2 139 46.6 
2W 21 17.2 94 46.6 
3E 8 8.0 n/a 25.1 
3W 8 8.0 40 39.0 
Test 5 
1E 34 34.2 64 82.7 
1W 40 34.2 54 82.7 
2E 10 10.2 34 30.0 
2W 15 10.2 31 30.0 
3E 3 5.6 n/a 18.2 
3W 4 5.6 n/a 21.5 
Test 6 
1E 16 24.6 20 64.8 
1W 31 24.6 65 64.8 
2E 15 17.8 52 48.1 
2W 14 17.8 63 48.1 
3E 12 8.3 44 25.8 
3W 7 8.3 n/a 40.1 
7. Impact damage characterization 
In addition to being able to predict whether or not an impact will penetrate or cause critical failure of a spacecraft 
wall, it is also important to be able to predict the nature and extent of the penetration. Specifically, in the case of a 
Whipple Shield, what is the size of the hole in the pressure wall? Will it be a cookie-cutter type hole, or a bulged hole 
with petals accompanied by cracking? And if the latter, what is the maximum extent of the cracking? While a remote 
possibility, if penetration-induced cracking were to occur on-orbit, unstable crack growth could develop which could 
lead to an unzipping of an impacted module.  
A series of studies was performed to develop empirical models of effective hole size and maximum tip-to-tip 
crack length for some of the multi-wall systems being developed for the international space station. The significance 
of the work performed is that those models could be incorporated directly into a survivability analysis to determine 
whether or not module unzipping would occur under a specific set of impact conditions. The prediction of hole size 
can also be used as part of a survivability analysis to determine the time available for module evacuation prior to the 
onset of incapacitation due to air loss. 
Early work employed rudimentary empirical curve fits of the space station Phase B and Phase C/D test data [34]. 
This initial work developed equations that included a variety of the geometric parameters that define a dual-wall 
configuration with an internal MLI blanket. Subsequent efforts focused on specific wall constructions being 
considered for the international space station [35]. Pressure wall hole diameter and maximum tip-to-tip crack equations 
developed in this study were of the form shown in the following equation: 
 
X = Af(θp)g(Vp)[1- e-C(Mp/MBL -1)]        (1) 
 
where X is either hole diameter or maximum tip-to-tip crack length, respectively. In equation (1), Vp, Mp and θp are 
the velocity, mass and obliquity of the impacting projectile while MBL is the ballistic limit mass at a velocity of interest 
for the particular system under consideration under a θp-degree impact. The use of projectile mass and ballistic limit 
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mass in equation (1) allows us to pool together the data obtained using different types of launchers. This form was 
chosen because (1) when using this form both hole diameter and crack length approach zero when the projectile 
diameter approaches the ballistic limit diameter value from above, and (2) these forms adequately represent the initial 
growth stage of hole diameter and maximum tip-to-tip crack length as the projectile diameter increases just beyond 
the ballistic limit diameters.  
Figure 31 shows a comparison of the predictions of the empirical equations for maximum tip-to-tip crack length 
for the baseline construction of the US Lab module (i.e. Whipple Shield + MLI) and for the enhanced US Lab module 

















Figure 31. Comparison of Maximum Tip-to-Tip Crack Length for Enhanced and Baseline (Unenhanced) US Lab Module (Normal Impact) 
 
The following points are evident from this figure. 
1. The enhanced systems have much higher ballistic limits than baseline systems. 
2. The initial slopes of the enhanced system curves are steeper than those of the baseline systems. 
3. The asymptotic values of the enhanced system curves are much higher than those of the baseline systems. 
These results indicate that enhanced systems, while more resistant to perforation than baseline systems, will 
sustain much larger cracks (and holes) – if they occur – than corresponding baseline systems, and will reach those 
higher values quicker. This conclusion can have serious implications when factored into risk assessments for 
spacecraft modules using walls of similar construction (see also [36]). 
In order to be able to assess whether or not unstable crack growth could develop (leading to possible module 
unzipping), it is first necessary to determine whether either petalling or cracking would even occur in the event of a 
module perforation. A study was performed to develop an empirical model that could be used to answer this question, 
that is, if a pressure wall were perforated, would the perforation be in the form of a petalled hole or a cookie-cutter 
hole? The resulting model was a petalling limit function (PLF) that predicts the onset of petalling in terms of impact 
conditions and spacecraft wall system geometry [37]. In a sense, it is analogous to the ballistic limit equation (BLE) 
that predicts the onset of pressure wall failure or perforation in terms of the same parameters.  
Figures 32a,b and 33a,b show plots of the ballistic limit equation (BLE) and petalling limit function (PLF) for these 
two baseline lab cylinder (BLC) and enhanced lab cylinder (ELC) wall systems for 0-deg and 45-deg impact 
trajectories, respectively. Also shown in these figures are the results of experimental tests with regard to whether a 
pressure wall perforation was in the form of a petalled hole or a cookie-cutter hole. 
As can be seen from Figures 32a,b, for the BLC wall system, there exist projectile diameter-impact velocity 
combinations that are above the ballistic limit curve but below the petalling limit curve (shown as region A in Figures 
32a,b). In this region, perforation of the pressure wall in a BLC wall system would result in cookie-cutter holes. 
However, above the petalling limit function (region B in Figures 32a,b), the intensity of the impact loading is such 
that pressure wall perforation would most likely be accompanied by petalling and cracking. We note that the scatter 
in the data in Figure 32a is not new or surprising. In fact, it is consistent with the scatter in the data used to obtain 
ballistic limit curves for similar multi-wall systems under similar impact conditions.  
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Test 5 
1E 34 34.2 64 82.7 
1W 40 34.2 54 82.7 
2E 10 10.2 34 30.0 
2W 15 10.2 31 30.0 
3E 3 5.6 n/a 18.2 
3W 4 5.6 n/a 21.5 
Test 6 
1E 16 24.6 20 64.8 
1W 31 24.6 65 64.8 
2E 15 17.8 52 48.1 
2W 14 17.8 63 48.1 
3E 12 8.3 44 25.8 
3W 7 8.3 n/a 40.1 
7. Impact damage characterization 
In addition to being able to predict whether or not an impact will penetrate or cause critical failure of a spacecraft 
wall, it is also important to be able to predict the nature and extent of the penetration. Specifically, in the case of a 
Whipple Shield, what is the size of the hole in the pressure wall? Will it be a cookie-cutter type hole, or a bulged hole 
with petals accompanied by cracking? And if the latter, what is the maximum extent of the cracking? While a remote 
possibility, if penetration-induced cracking were to occur on-orbit, unstable crack growth could develop which could 
lead to an unzipping of an impacted module.  
A series of studies was performed to develop empirical models of effective hole size and maximum tip-to-tip 
crack length for some of the multi-wall systems being developed for the international space station. The significance 
of the work performed is that those models could be incorporated directly into a survivability analysis to determine 
whether or not module unzipping would occur under a specific set of impact conditions. The prediction of hole size 
can also be used as part of a survivability analysis to determine the time available for module evacuation prior to the 
onset of incapacitation due to air loss. 
Early work employed rudimentary empirical curve fits of the space station Phase B and Phase C/D test data [34]. 
This initial work developed equations that included a variety of the geometric parameters that define a dual-wall 
configuration with an internal MLI blanket. Subsequent efforts focused on specific wall constructions being 
considered for the international space station [35]. Pressure wall hole diameter and maximum tip-to-tip crack equations 
developed in this study were of the form shown in the following equation: 
 
X = Af(θp)g(Vp)[1- e-C(Mp/MBL -1)]        (1) 
 
where X is either hole diameter or maximum tip-to-tip crack length, respectively. In equation (1), Vp, Mp and θp are 
the velocity, mass and obliquity of the impacting projectile while MBL is the ballistic limit mass at a velocity of interest 
for the particular system under consideration under a θp-degree impact. The use of projectile mass and ballistic limit 
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mass in equation (1) allows us to pool together the data obtained using different types of launchers. This form was 
chosen because (1) when using this form both hole diameter and crack length approach zero when the projectile 
diameter approaches the ballistic limit diameter value from above, and (2) these forms adequately represent the initial 
growth stage of hole diameter and maximum tip-to-tip crack length as the projectile diameter increases just beyond 
the ballistic limit diameters.  
Figure 31 shows a comparison of the predictions of the empirical equations for maximum tip-to-tip crack length 
for the baseline construction of the US Lab module (i.e. Whipple Shield + MLI) and for the enhanced US Lab module 

















Figure 31. Comparison of Maximum Tip-to-Tip Crack Length for Enhanced and Baseline (Unenhanced) US Lab Module (Normal Impact) 
 
The following points are evident from this figure. 
1. The enhanced systems have much higher ballistic limits than baseline systems. 
2. The initial slopes of the enhanced system curves are steeper than those of the baseline systems. 
3. The asymptotic values of the enhanced system curves are much higher than those of the baseline systems. 
These results indicate that enhanced systems, while more resistant to perforation than baseline systems, will 
sustain much larger cracks (and holes) – if they occur – than corresponding baseline systems, and will reach those 
higher values quicker. This conclusion can have serious implications when factored into risk assessments for 
spacecraft modules using walls of similar construction (see also [36]). 
In order to be able to assess whether or not unstable crack growth could develop (leading to possible module 
unzipping), it is first necessary to determine whether either petalling or cracking would even occur in the event of a 
module perforation. A study was performed to develop an empirical model that could be used to answer this question, 
that is, if a pressure wall were perforated, would the perforation be in the form of a petalled hole or a cookie-cutter 
hole? The resulting model was a petalling limit function (PLF) that predicts the onset of petalling in terms of impact 
conditions and spacecraft wall system geometry [37]. In a sense, it is analogous to the ballistic limit equation (BLE) 
that predicts the onset of pressure wall failure or perforation in terms of the same parameters.  
Figures 32a,b and 33a,b show plots of the ballistic limit equation (BLE) and petalling limit function (PLF) for these 
two baseline lab cylinder (BLC) and enhanced lab cylinder (ELC) wall systems for 0-deg and 45-deg impact 
trajectories, respectively. Also shown in these figures are the results of experimental tests with regard to whether a 
pressure wall perforation was in the form of a petalled hole or a cookie-cutter hole. 
As can be seen from Figures 32a,b, for the BLC wall system, there exist projectile diameter-impact velocity 
combinations that are above the ballistic limit curve but below the petalling limit curve (shown as region A in Figures 
32a,b). In this region, perforation of the pressure wall in a BLC wall system would result in cookie-cutter holes. 
However, above the petalling limit function (region B in Figures 32a,b), the intensity of the impact loading is such 
that pressure wall perforation would most likely be accompanied by petalling and cracking. We note that the scatter 
in the data in Figure 32a is not new or surprising. In fact, it is consistent with the scatter in the data used to obtain 
ballistic limit curves for similar multi-wall systems under similar impact conditions.  
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Figure 32a,b. Ballistic Limit Equation (BLE) and Petalling Limit Function (PLF) Curves for 















Figure 33a,b. Ballistic Limit Equation (BLE) and Petalling Limit Function (PLF) Curves for 
the Enhanced US Lab Cylinder (ELC) Wall System 
 
With regard to the ELC wall system, Figures 33a,b show that the petalling limit function is always below the 
ballistic limit curve.  Hence, pressure wall perforations in an ELC wall system will always be accompanied by petalling 
and cracking, even at relatively low impact velocities. This is borne out by the experimental data in Figures 33a,b, 
which show only petalled perforations. Thus, the model developed shows that the perforation of a spacecraft wall with 
an enhanced shield will always be accompanied by petalling and cracking, while the perforations of a Whipple-type 
spacecraft wall may or may not be petalled and cracked, depending on impact conditions.  
Parallel to these empirical modelling efforts, we also sought to develop an analytical, first principles-based model 
of hole diameter and maximum tip-to-tip crack length for a spacecraft module pressure wall that has been perforated 
in an orbital debris particle impact [38]. The analytical hole diameter and crack length models were developed by 
sequentially characterizing the phenomena comprising a normal impact event. These phenomena include the initial 
impact, the creation and motion of a debris cloud within a multiwall system, the impact of the debris cloud on the 
pressure wall, pressure wall deformation prior to crack formation, pressure wall crack initiation, propagation and 
arrest, and finally, pressure wall deformation following crack initiation and growth. Two types of multi-wall systems 
were considered: a Whipple-type system (where the inner wall is a multi-layer thermal insulation blanket) and an 
enhanced shielding system (where the inner wall consists of several layers of Kevlar and Nextel cloth added to an 
MLI blanket). 
As noted previously, some perforated pressure walls holes retained their flatness and contained what may be 
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called "cookie cutter holes", that is, holes with jagged edges from which pressure wall material had been simply 
punched out. Others were bulged with petals and extensive cracking. The model developed, therefore, also included 
the PL function described above as a means of determining, a priori, whether a pressure wall perforation would be in 
the form of a petalled hole or a cookie-cutter hole. Figure 34a,b shows a graphical representation of the early (just 













Figure 34a,b. Graphical Representation of the Pressure Wall Deformation and Petalling Model 
 
The table in Figure 35 shows how well the model was able to predict the hole diameter and crack length in several 
impact tests for three wall configurations. Model predictions compared fairly well with experimental results, but 
especially well for those tests highlighted in a red outline in Figure 33. This hole and crack length prediction model 


























Figure 36. Comparison of Model predictions and Experimental Results, Normal Impact 
 
Most recently [40], we updated the 1997 hole diameter and crack length equations (dubbed the S-W Model) by 
making them more general and by extending them to diameters and masses significantly beyond the ballistic limit of 
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Figure 33a,b. Ballistic Limit Equation (BLE) and Petalling Limit Function (PLF) Curves for 
the Enhanced US Lab Cylinder (ELC) Wall System 
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an enhanced shield will always be accompanied by petalling and cracking, while the perforations of a Whipple-type 
spacecraft wall may or may not be petalled and cracked, depending on impact conditions.  
Parallel to these empirical modelling efforts, we also sought to develop an analytical, first principles-based model 
of hole diameter and maximum tip-to-tip crack length for a spacecraft module pressure wall that has been perforated 
in an orbital debris particle impact [38]. The analytical hole diameter and crack length models were developed by 
sequentially characterizing the phenomena comprising a normal impact event. These phenomena include the initial 
impact, the creation and motion of a debris cloud within a multiwall system, the impact of the debris cloud on the 
pressure wall, pressure wall deformation prior to crack formation, pressure wall crack initiation, propagation and 
arrest, and finally, pressure wall deformation following crack initiation and growth. Two types of multi-wall systems 
were considered: a Whipple-type system (where the inner wall is a multi-layer thermal insulation blanket) and an 
enhanced shielding system (where the inner wall consists of several layers of Kevlar and Nextel cloth added to an 
MLI blanket). 
As noted previously, some perforated pressure walls holes retained their flatness and contained what may be 
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called "cookie cutter holes", that is, holes with jagged edges from which pressure wall material had been simply 
punched out. Others were bulged with petals and extensive cracking. The model developed, therefore, also included 
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the form of a petalled hole or a cookie-cutter hole. Figure 34a,b shows a graphical representation of the early (just 













Figure 34a,b. Graphical Representation of the Pressure Wall Deformation and Petalling Model 
 
The table in Figure 35 shows how well the model was able to predict the hole diameter and crack length in several 
impact tests for three wall configurations. Model predictions compared fairly well with experimental results, but 
especially well for those tests highlighted in a red outline in Figure 33. This hole and crack length prediction model 


























Figure 36. Comparison of Model predictions and Experimental Results, Normal Impact 
 
Most recently [40], we updated the 1997 hole diameter and crack length equations (dubbed the S-W Model) by 
making them more general and by extending them to diameters and masses significantly beyond the ballistic limit of 
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the system being impacted (called the W-S model). A generic hole diameter-vs-projectile diameter curve is shown in 
Figure 37 for a given impact velocity, trajectory obliquity, and shield system geometry. The general type of 
phenomenology shown in Figure 37 is broken up into 3 regions; each region corresponds to a certain type of projectile 
response and pressure wall hole growth pattern. The shape of the curve shown in each of these three regions is based 
on the following considerations.  
(1) Initially, the hole diameter (and the cracking) phenomena are governed by the nature of the debris cloud 
loading on the module pressure wall. This case corresponds to Region I of the curve shown in Figure 37. In 
Region I, the projectile is completely shattered upon impact and the degree of fragmentation increases with 
increasing projectile diameter. As a result, spread of the debris cloud created by the initial impact also 
increases as does the effective diameter of the hole in the pressure wall.  
(2) At a certain projectile diameter (labeled D1 in Figure 37), the projectile is too large for it to be completely 
shattered by the outer bumper or shielding system. Hence, for projectile diameters beyond this point (i.e. in 
Region II), the amount of projectile fragmentation decreases with increasing projectile diameter as does the 
spread of the debris cloud and the size of the hole in the pressure wall.  
(3) In Region III (i.e. for Dp >> D2), the projectile diameter is very large when compared to the ballistic limit 
diameter value, perhaps even as large as the spacing between the bumper and the pressure wall. In such cases, 
the multi-wall system can be expected to act as a single thin plate. Hence, the form of that part of the curve 
should be similar to that generated by single plate hole diameter equations. In this case, the pressure wall 
hole diameter again increases with increasing projectile diameter. 
Figures 37 and 38 present a sketch of the three-part equation (thick solid line) that we used as the basis for the W-
S model developed to model the response regimes as outlined above, and the implementation of the full model for the 




















Figure 37. Sketch of a Three-part Hole Diameter or Crack Length Equation 
 
We found that the predictions of the new W-S model fit the empirical data just as well as, if not better than, the 
previous S-W model and that the W-S model displayed the appropriate phenomenological hole size and crack length 
response characteristics as the diameter of the impacting projectile increased beyond the ballistic limit of a particular 
wall system. Based on these results, we believe that the new W-S hole and crack size model encoded will improve the 























Figure 38. Plot of the W-S Rear Wall Hole Diameter Prediction Model, 
US Lab Cylinder Wall System, 6.5 km/s Impact, 0-deg Trajectory Obliquity 
8. Uncertainly analysis 
All of the studies we have performed have been heavily reliant on data, whether as the basis for empirical or semi-
empirical response prediction models or against which the predictions of analytical models are compared. However, 
as we saw in Figures 12a,b and 26 a,b there can be quite a bit of scatter amongst high speed impact test data – it 
doesn’t always fall neatly into place. This gives rise to questions regarding our certainty of whatever information we 
extract from high speed impact tests and how repeatable it is, or put another way, what is the uncertainty in the results 
obtained in hypervelocity impact tests? Reporting uncertainty information enables those performing MMOD risk 
assessments to fold uncertainty information into those assessments, thereby putting them in perspective with the other 
risk contributors. Risk predictions can also be used to help prioritize research programs to reduce the highest 
contributors to risk and uncertainty first. 
Initial efforts focused on assessing the repeatability of light gas gun information [41]. A review of the Phase B 
and Phase C/D impact test parameters revealed that very few of the impact tests were repeated under the same impact 
conditions. Thus, a traditional repeatability analysis of the phenomena involved in the response of dual-wall structures 
to hypervelocity projectile impact was impossible to perform. A modified repeatability analysis was then performed 
by pooling together several related groups of similar tests. This resulted in sample sizes of at 5-10 related tests per 
group. Though the pooled test groups were by no means large, some sort of comparison and assessment of phenomena 
repeatability became possible.  
For example, one such grouping was all tests performed on dual-wall structures without MLI and with a 1.6-mm-
thick bumper, a 3.175-mm-thick pressure wall, and a 10.16-cm stand-off distance. Within that group, tests were then 
paired according to similarity in projectile diameter, trajectory obliquity, and impact velocity. Using the test pairs and 
groupings so created, a quantifiable level of repeatability for dual-wall systems tested in the NASA/MSFC light gas 
gun was determined by calculating the number of test pairs within a group of tests that did or did not sustain pressure 
wall perforation or rear-side spall in both tests of each test pair. The repeatability for that group of tests was then stated 
as the percentage of test pairs that were in agreement with regard to pressure wall perforation or rear-side spallation. 
This quantity was referred to as the repeatability index (RI) for the specific group of tests under consideration. In the 
end, we found that that the perforation RI was approx. 75%. In other words, in approx. 75% of the test pairs considered, 
either both walls were perforated, or both walls were not. 
NASA currently uses the BUMPER code to calculate the risk of MMOD penetration for the International Space 
Station (ISS), extravehicular activity (EVA) suits, and other spacecraft. While BUMPER is a powerful tool, one of its 
limitations is that it provides a point estimate of MMOD risk with no assessment of its associated uncertainty. One 
reason for this is that the uncertainties associated with input models underlying BUMPER are largely unknown.  
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the system being impacted (called the W-S model). A generic hole diameter-vs-projectile diameter curve is shown in 
Figure 37 for a given impact velocity, trajectory obliquity, and shield system geometry. The general type of 
phenomenology shown in Figure 37 is broken up into 3 regions; each region corresponds to a certain type of projectile 
response and pressure wall hole growth pattern. The shape of the curve shown in each of these three regions is based 
on the following considerations.  
(1) Initially, the hole diameter (and the cracking) phenomena are governed by the nature of the debris cloud 
loading on the module pressure wall. This case corresponds to Region I of the curve shown in Figure 37. In 
Region I, the projectile is completely shattered upon impact and the degree of fragmentation increases with 
increasing projectile diameter. As a result, spread of the debris cloud created by the initial impact also 
increases as does the effective diameter of the hole in the pressure wall.  
(2) At a certain projectile diameter (labeled D1 in Figure 37), the projectile is too large for it to be completely 
shattered by the outer bumper or shielding system. Hence, for projectile diameters beyond this point (i.e. in 
Region II), the amount of projectile fragmentation decreases with increasing projectile diameter as does the 
spread of the debris cloud and the size of the hole in the pressure wall.  
(3) In Region III (i.e. for Dp >> D2), the projectile diameter is very large when compared to the ballistic limit 
diameter value, perhaps even as large as the spacing between the bumper and the pressure wall. In such cases, 
the multi-wall system can be expected to act as a single thin plate. Hence, the form of that part of the curve 
should be similar to that generated by single plate hole diameter equations. In this case, the pressure wall 
hole diameter again increases with increasing projectile diameter. 
Figures 37 and 38 present a sketch of the three-part equation (thick solid line) that we used as the basis for the W-
S model developed to model the response regimes as outlined above, and the implementation of the full model for the 




















Figure 37. Sketch of a Three-part Hole Diameter or Crack Length Equation 
 
We found that the predictions of the new W-S model fit the empirical data just as well as, if not better than, the 
previous S-W model and that the W-S model displayed the appropriate phenomenological hole size and crack length 
response characteristics as the diameter of the impacting projectile increased beyond the ballistic limit of a particular 
wall system. Based on these results, we believe that the new W-S hole and crack size model encoded will improve the 























Figure 38. Plot of the W-S Rear Wall Hole Diameter Prediction Model, 
US Lab Cylinder Wall System, 6.5 km/s Impact, 0-deg Trajectory Obliquity 
8. Uncertainly analysis 
All of the studies we have performed have been heavily reliant on data, whether as the basis for empirical or semi-
empirical response prediction models or against which the predictions of analytical models are compared. However, 
as we saw in Figures 12a,b and 26 a,b there can be quite a bit of scatter amongst high speed impact test data – it 
doesn’t always fall neatly into place. This gives rise to questions regarding our certainty of whatever information we 
extract from high speed impact tests and how repeatable it is, or put another way, what is the uncertainty in the results 
obtained in hypervelocity impact tests? Reporting uncertainty information enables those performing MMOD risk 
assessments to fold uncertainty information into those assessments, thereby putting them in perspective with the other 
risk contributors. Risk predictions can also be used to help prioritize research programs to reduce the highest 
contributors to risk and uncertainty first. 
Initial efforts focused on assessing the repeatability of light gas gun information [41]. A review of the Phase B 
and Phase C/D impact test parameters revealed that very few of the impact tests were repeated under the same impact 
conditions. Thus, a traditional repeatability analysis of the phenomena involved in the response of dual-wall structures 
to hypervelocity projectile impact was impossible to perform. A modified repeatability analysis was then performed 
by pooling together several related groups of similar tests. This resulted in sample sizes of at 5-10 related tests per 
group. Though the pooled test groups were by no means large, some sort of comparison and assessment of phenomena 
repeatability became possible.  
For example, one such grouping was all tests performed on dual-wall structures without MLI and with a 1.6-mm-
thick bumper, a 3.175-mm-thick pressure wall, and a 10.16-cm stand-off distance. Within that group, tests were then 
paired according to similarity in projectile diameter, trajectory obliquity, and impact velocity. Using the test pairs and 
groupings so created, a quantifiable level of repeatability for dual-wall systems tested in the NASA/MSFC light gas 
gun was determined by calculating the number of test pairs within a group of tests that did or did not sustain pressure 
wall perforation or rear-side spall in both tests of each test pair. The repeatability for that group of tests was then stated 
as the percentage of test pairs that were in agreement with regard to pressure wall perforation or rear-side spallation. 
This quantity was referred to as the repeatability index (RI) for the specific group of tests under consideration. In the 
end, we found that that the perforation RI was approx. 75%. In other words, in approx. 75% of the test pairs considered, 
either both walls were perforated, or both walls were not. 
NASA currently uses the BUMPER code to calculate the risk of MMOD penetration for the International Space 
Station (ISS), extravehicular activity (EVA) suits, and other spacecraft. While BUMPER is a powerful tool, one of its 
limitations is that it provides a point estimate of MMOD risk with no assessment of its associated uncertainty. One 
reason for this is that the uncertainties associated with input models underlying BUMPER are largely unknown.  
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These underlying models include damage prediction / ballistic limit equations, environment models, and failure 
criteria definitions. In order to attempt to quantify the overall uncertainty bounds on MMOD risk predictions, the 
uncertainty in these three areas must be identified. In a more recent study [42,43], we presented several possible 
approaches through which uncertainty bounds and/or confidence intervals could be developed for the various damage 
prediction (DP) and ballistic limit (BL) equations encoded within BUMPER. 
The DP equations in BUMPER are curve-fits to empirical data, that is, they are the results of statistical regression 
analyses of available test data. As such, uncertainty bounds and/or confidence intervals can readily be obtained at the 
time that the regression analyses are being performed to form the DP equations. However, unlike DP equations, BL 
equations are not statistically based. They are not curve-fits, but are rather simply lines of demarcation between regions 
of penetration and non-penetration in regions where test data exist. In regions where test data does not exist, lines are 
drawn based on assumed forms and assumed exponents of various terms. As a result, and also unlike the DP equations, 
it is simply not possible to obtain uncertainty bounds and/or confidence intervals as part of the current procedure that 
is used to derive the BL equations. Alternative, innovative approaches must be developed to either (i) obtain the 
required uncertainty information from existing BL equations and the data on which they are based, or (ii) re-derive 
the BL equations using a statistics-based approach so that uncertainty information is forthcoming out of the analyses 
along with the equations themselves.  
9. Debris cloud characterization  
The key to conducting an accurate damage assessment of a target impacted by a high speed projectile is the use 
of a robust assessment methodology. To accurately determine total target damage, a damage assessment methodology 
must include the effects of discrete impacts by solid debris cloud fragments as well as impulsive loadings due to 
molten and vaporous debris cloud material. As a result, the amount of debris cloud material in each of the three states 
of matter must be known to accurately assess total target damage and break-up due to a high speed impact. To begin 
addressing this need, a first-principles based model was developed [44] to calculate:  
 the amount of material in a debris cloud created by a perforating hypervelocity impact that is solid, molten, and 
vaporous; 
 the debris cloud leading edge, trailing edge, center-of-mass, and expansion velocities; and,  
 the angular spread of the debris cloud material.  
 
Figure 39 shows a sketch of a debris cloud as well as characteristic velocity parameters of interest. These 
quantities were calculated using conservation of mass, momentum, and energy together with equations of state for the 



















Figure 39. Sketch of Debris Cloud with Expansion Velocities 
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The shock pressures, energies, etc., in the projectile and target materials are calculated using the three one-
dimensional shock-jump conditions, a linear relationship between the shock wave velocity and particle velocity in 
each material, and continuity of pressure and velocity at the projectile-target interface. Solving the resulting equations 
simultaneously yields expressions for projectile and target particle velocities that are then used to calculate shock 
velocities, pressures, internal energies, and material densities after the passage of a shock wave. 
Although the shock loading of a material is an irreversible process that results in an increase of the internal energy 
of the shocked material, the release of a shocked material occurs isentropically along an "isentrope" or "release 
adiabat." The difference between the area under the isentrope and the energy of the shocked state is the amount of 
residual energy that remains in the material and can cause the material to melt or even vaporize. To calculate the 
release of the projectile and target materials from their respective shocked states, an appropriate equation-of-state is 
needed for each material. To keep the analysis relatively simple, the Tillotson equation-of-state was used. 
Once the residual internal energies in the shocked and released portions of the projectile and target materials are 
obtained, the percentages of the various states of matter in the resulting debris cloud are estimated using fundamental 
thermodynamic relationships between energy, specific heat, and temperature.  
The table in Figure 40 compares the predictions of this model against numerical and empirical results obtained in 
previous studies of debris cloud formation. It is evident that the model did quite well in matching previous results for 





















Figure 40. Comparison of Model Predictions with Numerical and Experimental Results 
 
Following on the success of using 1-D shock physics and elementary mechanical and thermodynamic principles 
in modelling normal impact, we decided to investigate whether or not it would be possible to apply this approach to 
oblique impact. Figure 41 shows a sketch of an oblique impact on a thin plate along with the parameters that 
characterize the debris clouds that are created as a result of such an impact. 
As can be seen from Figure 41, the number of unknowns to be determined to completely characterize the three 
debris clouds is twelve: three debris cloud masses, three axial velocities, three expansion velocities, and three center-
of-mass trajectories. Conservation of mass, energy, and momentum (horizontal and vertical) provide four equations, 
far short of the twelve required. A shock physics-based model of the impact was developed to provide additional 
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Figure 39. Sketch of Debris Cloud with Expansion Velocities 
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The shock pressures, energies, etc., in the projectile and target materials are calculated using the three one-
dimensional shock-jump conditions, a linear relationship between the shock wave velocity and particle velocity in 
each material, and continuity of pressure and velocity at the projectile-target interface. Solving the resulting equations 
simultaneously yields expressions for projectile and target particle velocities that are then used to calculate shock 
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Although the shock loading of a material is an irreversible process that results in an increase of the internal energy 
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residual energy that remains in the material and can cause the material to melt or even vaporize. To calculate the 
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needed for each material. To keep the analysis relatively simple, the Tillotson equation-of-state was used. 
Once the residual internal energies in the shocked and released portions of the projectile and target materials are 
obtained, the percentages of the various states of matter in the resulting debris cloud are estimated using fundamental 
thermodynamic relationships between energy, specific heat, and temperature.  
The table in Figure 40 compares the predictions of this model against numerical and empirical results obtained in 
previous studies of debris cloud formation. It is evident that the model did quite well in matching previous results for 





















Figure 40. Comparison of Model Predictions with Numerical and Experimental Results 
 
Following on the success of using 1-D shock physics and elementary mechanical and thermodynamic principles 
in modelling normal impact, we decided to investigate whether or not it would be possible to apply this approach to 
oblique impact. Figure 41 shows a sketch of an oblique impact on a thin plate along with the parameters that 
characterize the debris clouds that are created as a result of such an impact. 
As can be seen from Figure 41, the number of unknowns to be determined to completely characterize the three 
debris clouds is twelve: three debris cloud masses, three axial velocities, three expansion velocities, and three center-
of-mass trajectories. Conservation of mass, energy, and momentum (horizontal and vertical) provide four equations, 
far short of the twelve required. A shock physics-based model of the impact was developed to provide additional 





















Figure 41. Oblique High Speed Impact of a Dual-Wall Structure 
 
Early efforts focused on attempting closed-form (or nearly closed form) solutions involving the conservation 
equations and elementary shock physics equations (see, e.g. [45] and [46]). These initial efforts were not as successful 
as hoped for, and required the introduction of a large number of empirical constants. In an attempt to reduce the 
reliance of such approaches on empirical parameters, we endeavored to use oblique shock wave theory as a means of 
directly obtaining some of the debris could velocity and trajectory parameters shown in Figure 41 [47]. Figures 42a,b 
illustrate the parameterization of the various penetrating and ricochet shock waves created in the impact. Figures 
43a,b,c show comparisons between the predictions of the model for the three trajectory angle and numerical and 
experimental results. While the trends predicted by the model compared favorably with the experimental results, there 
were some discrepancies in the actual values of the various center-of-mass trajectories. A possible reason for the 
























Figure 43a,b,c. Model Predictions, Numerical Results, and Empirical Data Comparisons 
32 Author name / Procedia Engineering 00 (2017) 000–000 
10. Pressurize vessels 
Most spacecraft have at least one pressurized vessel on board. For robotic spacecraft, it is usually a liquid 
propellant tank, while for human spacecraft there are the pressurized living quarters (or modules). Although 
considerable energy and effort has been expended in the study of the response of non-pressurized spacecraft 
components to these kinds of impacts, relatively few studies have been conducted on the pressurized elements of such 
spacecraft. Several studies were performed [48] in an effort to address several aspects of this problem, including: 
 an examination of how well current BLEs predict damage that might occur in pressurized spacecraft components,  
 the development of general, data-driven equations that differentiate between impact conditions that would result 
in only a small hole or crack in a pressurized tank  from those that would cause catastrophic tank failure, and  
 the development of a first-principles based model that predicts whether or not cracking might start or a through-
crack might result under a crater in a thin plate. 
10.2 Effect of internal stress fields on ballistic limit 
When we first looked at whether or not the BLEs derived using unstressed plates were applicable to stressed 
plates, we found that (1) for the most part, if an unstressed plate was penetrated, so was the corresponding stressed 
plate (and vice versa), and (2) the size of the perforation as well as the extent of cracking did show some dependence 
on the presence of the inner wall stress field [49]. However, no comparisons were made against BLE predictions since 
at the time of that study NASA had not yet put forth a vetted and calibrated BLE for dual-wall systems. Such BLEs 
now exist for many different types of dual- and multi-wall configurations. 
In this study, the data in [49] was re-analyzed and compared against the predictions of the 1993 and 2001 NASA 
BLEs for aluminum dual-wall systems (i.e. those in Refs. [50] and [51], respectively). Figure 44 shows a comparison 



























Figure 44. Comparisons of Test Data vs BLE Predictions, 0-deg Impacts 

















Figure 41. Oblique High Speed Impact of a Dual-Wall Structure 
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Figure 44. Comparisons of Test Data vs BLE Predictions, 0-deg Impacts 
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From these figures we see that: 
 For relatively low internal pressures, the presence of an internal stress field does not appear to have any 
significant effect on whether or not the inner wall of a dual-wall configuration will be penetrated 
following a hypervelocity impact. 
 It is not possible to say at this time whether or not the same holds true for spacecraft components under 
much higher internal pressures. The reason for this is that the primary objective of nearly all of the testing 
performed with high pressure vessels or tanks was to study what would happen WHEN the tanks were 
perforated, and not to determine IF they would be perforated.  
 The 2001 BLE appears to perform reasonably well in predicting the P / NP response of dual-wall systems 
with stressed inner walls for the particular stress state considered. However, it appears to be less 
conservative than might be acceptable since it predicts as non-penetrating several impacts that did actual 


























Figure 45. Comparisons of Test Data vs BLE Predictions, 45-deg Impacts 
10.3 Tank perforation vs rupture 
Of specific interest in this study was whether a high-speed impact would cause a tank to rupture (i.e. a catastrophic 
failure), or if it merely would result in an entry hole or entry and exit holes. This is an important consideration in the 
design of a pressurized tank – if possible, design parameters and operating conditions should be chosen such that 
additional sizable debris (such as that which would be created in the event of tank rupture or catastrophic failure) are 
not created as a result of an on-orbit MMOD particle impact. 
The objective of the work that was performed was to develop empirically-based equations that could be used to 
determine whether or not a particular set of impact parameters under a specified operation condition would result in 
the rupture of the tank [48]. To render the equations as broadly applicable as possible, the operating conditions (x-
axis) were parameterized as the hoop stress in the tank (normalized with respect to the ultimate stress of the tank wall 
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material), and the impact conditions (y-axis) were parameterized as impact energy (normalized with respect to a 
number of appropriate tank wall material properties). Figure 40 is a plot of this data for radially impacted, unshielded, 
cylindrical metallic tanks, showing which tests resulted in tank rupture (red data points) and which did not (green data 
points).  
Also plotted in Figure 46 are some possible forms of demarcation lines between tests that did not result in tank 
rupture (green data markers) and tests that did (red data markers). In Figure 40 it is evident that a linear demarcation 
line would not be feasible and that an exponential line would have only limited applicability; however, a power law 










































Figure 46. Rupture / Non-Rupture Response of Radially Impacted Cylindrical Metallic Tanks 
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Figure 45. Comparisons of Test Data vs BLE Predictions, 45-deg Impacts 
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material), and the impact conditions (y-axis) were parameterized as impact energy (normalized with respect to a 
number of appropriate tank wall material properties). Figure 40 is a plot of this data for radially impacted, unshielded, 
cylindrical metallic tanks, showing which tests resulted in tank rupture (red data points) and which did not (green data 
points).  
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10.4 Analytical modelling 
Pressurized tank wall failure following a high-speed impact can occur in any number of ways. In the event of a 
tank wall perforation, these failure mechanisms include  
a. a through-hole on the front-facing tank wall (with only pitting on the inside of the rear surface), 
b. a through-hole on the front and on the rear walls, or  
c. so-called ‘wing cracks’ that emanate from a through-hole on either the front or rear wall (these cracks could 
lead to catastrophic failure of the tank, but not necessarily). 
Even if tank perforation does not occur (that is, the front wall sustains only crater damage), it is possible that a crack 
might emanate from the floor of one of the deeper craters, and, under the right conditions, grows through the tank wall 
until it reaches the rear surface of the front wall. While the failure modes associated with tank perforation (and 
longitudinal cracks that might develop from the edges of such perforations) have been studied extensively by other 
investigators, tank failure resulting from a crack forming at the floor of a deep crater or pit has not.  
The latter tank failure mode (i.e. failure due to cracking without perforation) appears to be linked to the design 
criteria currently used by NASA and its contractors to design pressurized tanks. As such, the objective of this study 
was to develop a first-principles based model that can be used to assess the effect of penetration depth on the possibility 
of a crack forming under a crater, and whether or not the crack might grow through the tank wall thickness [52]. Figure 





















Figure 47. Flow of Calculations in Cracking Formation Model 
 
Figure 48 shows the plot obtained by running the model for Ti-6Al-4V tanks for a series of penetration depths 
relative to tank wall thickness and a series of operating conditions (hoop stress relative to material yield stress). Figure 
46 highlights the nominal operating condition of the SMAP satellite currently being built as well as where the results 
of some experimental tests from [53] and [54] might lie when the model is run using the conditions of those tests. In 
Figure 46, we see that the phenomenology evident in experimental data agrees with the predictions of the model 
developed herein:  
a. the tests (purple square markers) that resulted in tank wall cratering without rupture (but possibly cracking 
under the crater) [53] fall in the regime where the model predicts that cracking might occur under a crater, 
but not loss of pressurization, and 
b. the test (teal triangle) that resulted in tank rupture [54] falls in the regime where the model predicts that the 
length of the initial crack plus the plastic zone ahead of it will likely exceed the thickness of the tank wall 
material under the crater. 




































Figure 48. Model Predictions of Regions of Cracking and Through-Cracking for Ti-6Al-4V Tank Walls 
 
11. Other Studies and Recent Efforts 
In addition to the studies noted above, I have also been engaged in a number of other studies related to the response 
of aerospace structures to high speed impact. These efforts have included an analysis of window materials impact data 
[55], a study of the effect of the location of an intervening MLI blanket within a dual-wall system on the impact 
response of the system [56], the use of corrugated bumpers instead of monolith bumpers [57], shock-physics-based 
modelling of hole formation in a thin plate [58], effect of pressure wall material on perforation response [59], the 
reliability of results obtained the simultaneously-launched multiple projectiles [60], and the design of penetration 
resistant lunar habitats [61-63]. 
12. Concluding Thoughts 
In recent years I have been fortunate to have been asked to serve on several NRC/NAE and NESC Technical 
Committees. These committees have explored the resiliency of the Space Shuttle against MMOC impacts [64], 
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11. Other Studies and Recent Efforts 
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modelling of hole formation in a thin plate [58], effect of pressure wall material on perforation response [59], the 
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12. Concluding Thoughts 
In recent years I have been fortunate to have been asked to serve on several NRC/NAE and NESC Technical 
Committees. These committees have explored the resiliency of the Space Shuttle against MMOC impacts [64], 
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assessed NASA’s BUMPER II computer code as its primary risk assessment tool [65], its overall MMOD program 
and program elements [66], and the U.S. Air Force’s astrodynamics standards [67]. In other instances, these 
committees have wrestled with technical issue faced by existing and emerging NASA programs, such as Orion Crew 
Exploration Vehicle [68], the International Space Station [69,70], and the new JPSS satellite. In all instances, the 
committee were able to provide advice and technical assistance to NASA to help it meet is goals and objectives. 
Looking back, I would say that the road has been fun, interesting, and educational. I have been fortunate to work with 
many smart, talented people. I continuing to enjoy solving problems, and I hope to be able to continue working in this 
area with many more such individuals for many years ahead! 
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assessed NASA’s BUMPER II computer code as its primary risk assessment tool [65], its overall MMOD program 
and program elements [66], and the U.S. Air Force’s astrodynamics standards [67]. In other instances, these 
committees have wrestled with technical issue faced by existing and emerging NASA programs, such as Orion Crew 
Exploration Vehicle [68], the International Space Station [69,70], and the new JPSS satellite. In all instances, the 
committee were able to provide advice and technical assistance to NASA to help it meet is goals and objectives. 
Looking back, I would say that the road has been fun, interesting, and educational. I have been fortunate to work with 
many smart, talented people. I continuing to enjoy solving problems, and I hope to be able to continue working in this 
area with many more such individuals for many years ahead! 
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